Architecture
An Anchor instance is one Cloudflare Worker and the platform resources it binds to.
┌──────────────────────────── Cloudflare ────────────────────────────┐ browser ──HTTPS──▶ │ Worker (Hono) │ anchor CLI ──────▶ │ ├─ /api/v1/* ── authenticate ─▶ authorize ─▶ service ─▶ D1 │ CI (token) ──────▶ │ ├─ static assets: the dashboard (SPA, apps/web/dist) │ │ ├─ queue consumer ◀── anchor-reencrypt (dead letters: -dlq) │ │ └─ cron 0 3 * * *: purge old audit events, resume rotations │ │ │ │ Worker secrets: ANCHOR_ROOT_KEY (+ _ID, _PREVIOUS, _PREVIOUS_ID) │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘| Piece | Role |
|---|---|
Worker (apps/server) |
HTTP API on Hono, the queue consumer and the scheduled handler, in one script |
| D1 | The source of truth: users, sessions, projects, environments, members, service tokens, wrapped project keys, encrypted secret versions, the audit log |
| Queues | anchor-reencrypt carries project-key rotation batches; anchor-reencrypt-dlq catches messages that exhaust their retries |
| Static assets | The dashboard (apps/web, React) built into apps/web/dist and served by the same Worker |
| Cron Trigger | Daily at 03:00 UTC: deletes audit events older than 365 days and re-sends idle rotations |
CLI (apps/cli) |
A client of the same HTTP API, for developers and CI |
D1 is strongly consistent, so a revoked token or a removed member is denied on the next request: authorization reads memberships and tokens from D1 on every call, with no cache. Anchor does not use KV.
A secret read, step by step
Section titled “A secret read, step by step”- The request carries a session (the
__Host-anchor_sessioncookie from the dashboard, or a bearer session from the CLI) or a service token (Authorization: Bearer, CI). - The Worker hashes the presented token and looks it up in D1. Expired or revoked:
401. authorize()checks the action (secret:read) against the instance role, the project membership (role and allowed environments) or the token’s scopes. Denied:403.- The service loads the encrypted version, unwraps the project key with the root key, and
decrypts the value. With
expand=trueit resolves${...}references (each hop authorized the same way); withincludeImports=trueit adds the secrets of imported folders. - The read is written to the audit log before the value is returned. If the audit insert fails, the read fails: no unaudited secret reads.
Key hierarchy
Section titled “Key hierarchy”ANCHOR_ROOT_KEY (256-bit, Worker secret, id ANCHOR_ROOT_KEY_ID, default "rk1") └─ wraps (AES-256-GCM, AAD "anchor/kek/v1|<project>|<version>") Project key (KEK), one per project and version, stored wrapped in D1 └─ encrypts (AES-256-GCM, AAD "anchor/secret/v1|<project>|<environment>|<secret>|<version>") Secret value, one ciphertext per secret version- Every encryption uses a fresh random 96-bit IV.
- The AAD binds each ciphertext to its row: a ciphertext copied to another secret, version, environment or project fails to decrypt.
- Rotating a project key creates a new KEK version and re-encrypts values in the background (runbook). Rotating the root key re-wraps the KEKs only (runbook).
Repository layout
Section titled “Repository layout”| Path | What |
|---|---|
apps/server |
The Worker, D1 migrations, queue consumer, cron |
apps/web |
The dashboard |
apps/cli |
The anchor CLI |
apps/docs |
This site |
packages/shared |
Zod schemas and types shared by all three |