Rate limiting
Every failed login, including one for an email that does not exist, writes an audit row that
cannot be deleted for 365 days. Anchor itself does not rate-limit by IP yet. Without a limit,
anonymous traffic can grow the database until audit inserts fail, and because secret reads fail
closed when they cannot be audited, secret reads then fail too. Add a Cloudflare rate-limiting rule
(dashboard → Security → WAF → Rate limiting rules) for POST /api/v1/auth/* and
POST /api/v1/invites/*, for example 20 requests per minute per IP, and watch the D1 size. The
same rule covers the anonymous CLI browser login endpoints (POST /api/v1/auth/cli/start and
/token); allow for one poll every 5 seconds per waiting anchor login. Anchor also caps pending
browser logins at 5 per IP address and 50 instance-wide, and refuses polls faster than every 5
seconds.
Since 0.4.0 the OAuth endpoints for MCP clients are anonymous too: add POST /oauth/* to the same
rule (/oauth/register, /oauth/token, /oauth/revoke). An agent refreshes its token about once
an hour, so a limit of 20 per minute per IP leaves plenty of room. Anchor also caps clients that
registered but were never approved at 10 per IP address and 500 instance-wide, and deletes them
after 24 hours.
Anchor limits logins itself (0.5.3): 5 failed logins for one email from one address (an IPv6 /64 counts as one) lock that pair for 15 minutes, and 50 failed logins from one address lock the address for 15 minutes. That
protects passwords, not the database: requests for unknown emails, and requests during a lock, are
still audited, so a rule in front of /api/v1/auth/* is still worth having.